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MOTION PICTURE SPLIT AGREEMENTS:
AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Motion picture exhibitors' in a particular geographic area often
allocate among themselves the first right to negotiate with distribu-
tors2 for licenses to show upcoming films. They then refrain from
submitting competing offers for films that have been allocated to
other members of the "split agreement" 3 until the first right of negoti-
ation has lapsed. This practice of splitting the rights to negotiate for
upcoming films has been prevalent in the film industry for over thirty-
five years. 4
1. An exhibitor may be defined as "[a]ny person engaged in the business of
operating one or more theatres." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-3 (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984). Exhibitors can be classified as either circuits or independents. Circuits are
large chains of theaters with common ownership. Independents are smaller, unaffili-
ated theater owners. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485,
488 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. A distributor may be defined as "[a]ny person engaged in the business of
renting, selling or licensing feature motion pictures to exhibitors." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
73, § 203-3 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). There are seven major distributors of motion
pictures: Buena Vista Distribution Co., Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Para-
mount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., MGM-UA Entertain-
meht Co., Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., and Warner Brothers Distributing Corp.
Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488, 487 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1982); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1054
(W.D. Va. 1981). These distribution companies are affiliated with production com-
panies which finance the motion pictures. Together the "majors" distribute films
which produce over 85% of the annual national box office revenue. Southway
Theatres, 672 F.2d at 487-88; Greenbrier Cinemas, 511 F. Supp. at 1054. See
generally Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribu-
tion and Price Making, 31 S. Cal. L. Rev. 150, 154-55 (1958) (describing market
structure of film distribution); Whitman, Anti-Trust Cases Affecting the Distribution
of Motion Pictures, 7 Fordham L. Rev. 189, 189 (1938) (same).
There are also two large independent unaffiliated distributors: Embassy Pictures
Corp. (formerly Avco Embassy Pictures Corp.) and Orion Pictures, Inc. (formerly
Filmways Pictures, Inc.). United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 136
(E.D. Wis. 1983); see Greenbrier Cinemas, 511 F. Supp. at 1049 & nn.5, 6.
3. Split agreements are also known as "split of product" agreements, "splits"
and "surgery." These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
4. Split agreements "have been widely used in the motion picture industry,
especially since the case of United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. [1948]." Green-
brier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (W.D. Va. 1981)
(citation omitted); see Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320
F.2d 285, 292 n.7 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378
U.S. 123 (1964); Gordon, Horizontal and Vertical Restraints of Trade: The Legality
of Motion Picture Splits Under the Antitrust Laws, 75 Yale L.J. 239, 241 (1965)
("Splits are the prevailing mode of market allocation for film product."); Comment,
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Some distributors claim that split agreements are illegal restraints of
trade under section I of the Sherman Act5 because splits tend to reduce
competition for film licenses.6 Moreover, they argue that these agree-
ments are per se illega 7 because they are so inherently anticompetitive
An Experiment in Preventive Anti-trust: Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture
Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 Yale L.J. 1040, 1073 & n. 133
(1965) (splits are "very common") [hereinafter cited as The Paramount Decrees];
United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1 ("Split agreements
have been widely used by motion picture exhibitors for decades."); see also Cassady,
supra note 2, at 164 (discussing splits as an alternative to competitive bidding prior to
1958).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 provides, in part, that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." Id. The language of § 1 is very broad, proscribing "every" contract that
restrains trade. A literal reading of the statute would prohibit all contracts, because
"[t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606
(1972); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898). The legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act makes clear, however, that Congress intended for the
courts to delineate the contours of the statute by drawing upon the common law. 21
Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); see United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972). Early on, the courts recognized that a narrow
reading of § 1 was inappropriate. Instead, the language of the Act has been read as
protecting the "freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract," Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911), and precluding only those conspiracies
which "unreasonably" restrain trade. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-
07 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1911). See generally L. Sullivan, Handbook
of the Law of Antitrust §§ 63-65 (1977) (discussing early development of antitrust
laws); Forkosch, Antitrust in the United States: Some Thoughts On Historical and
Recent Developments, 11 Gonz. L. Rev. 892 (1976) (same).
6. See, e.g., Syufy Enters. v. National Gen. Theatres, Inc., 575 F.2d 233, 234
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista
Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Splits have also been
challenged by the United States Government, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv.,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 135-36 (E.D. Wis. 1983). Split agreements are frequently
challenged by exhibitors. See infra notes 62, 153 and accompanying text.
7. Although the term "per se" was used for the first time in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), the classic definition of the
doctrine was enunciated in 1958 by Justice Black in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. This principal of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more
certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity
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that elaborate inquiry into the "precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use"" is unwarranted.9
The Department of Justice has recently adopted the position that
split agreements are per se illegal.' 0 Some courts, however, have held
that conclusive presumptions regarding the anticompetitive nature of
splits are unjustified." These courts require a detailed "rule of rea-
for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into
the entire history of the the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlaw-
ful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boy-
cotts, and tying arrangements.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted); accord Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S.
643, 645-47 (1980) (per curiam); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 & n.16
(1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-62 (1963); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d
1351, 1362-65 (5th Cir. 1980); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109
(1973). See generally L. Sullivan, supra note 5, §§ 63-64, 67, 70-72 (development and
scope of per se rule); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) (same); von Kalinowski, The Per Se
Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 UCLA L. Rev. 569, 569-82
(1964) (same).
There are several significant reasons for allowing generalizations and conclusive
presumptions to be drawn in antitrust cases. First, the per se rule provides guidance
to the person planning a new transaction by delineating which type of restraints are
proscribed by the Act. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343
(1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 n.11 (1979); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1979); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 Va. L. Rev.
1165, 1165-66 (1964); Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1531, 1535 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Concerted Refusals to
Deal]. Second, it benefits the parties and the judiciary by reducing the need for a
complicated and prolonged investigation into whether a particular restraint is unrea-
sonable. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343; Continental T. V., Inc.,
433 U.S. at 50 n.16; Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5; Concerted Refusals to Deal,
supra, at 1535. Third, it avoids the necessity of judicial resolution of technical and
complex issues which are often beyond the capabilities of the judge. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343; Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 609-10 &
n.10; F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 440
(1970).
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 2.
11. E.g., Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285,
293 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123
1983]
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son"'12 inquiry into all of the circumstances surrounding the use and
effect of a particular split agreement to determine whether it is anti-
competitive.
Part I of this Note discusses the structure of the motion picture
industry and the methods of film licensing and illustrates how splits
operate within this framework. Part II scrutinizes the anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects of split agreements. In particular, it dis-
cusses whether split agreements can be characterized as any of the
practices-group boycotts, horizontal market divisions or horizontal
price fixing agreements-that courts have found to be so thoroughly
anticompetitive that they are presumed illegal. 13 After determining
that these agreements may be characterized as horizontal market
divisions, horizontal price fixing agreements and, depending upon the
nature of the agreement, group boycotts, this Note examines the
economic justifications for the use of splits to determine whether they
fall within the ambit of the per se rule. This Note concludes that splits
lack procompetitive effects sufficient to justify an extensive inquiry
into their purpose and effect and, therefore, are per se illegal.
(1964); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1060 (W.D.
Va. 1981). See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
12. Justice Brandeis, in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), announced what is still the classic formulation of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238. In essence, the rule of reason requires the judge to decide whether, under
all of the circumstances of the case, the allegedly restrictive practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competititon. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical SoC'y,
457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972); Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395 (1927); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362
(5th Cir. 1980). See generally L. Sullivan, supra note 5, §§ 65-69, 72 (1977) (develop-
ment and scope of rule of reason); Bork, supra note 7, at 820-28 (same).
13. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Tying arrange-
ments, which are defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product," are also per
se illegal. Id.; see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259, 262-63
(1963); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947). Tying
arrangements do not arise in the context of split agreements, and are thus beyond the
scope of this Note.
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I. THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY AND SPLIT AGREEMENTS
A. Motion Picture Licensing
During the 1930's the motion picture industry was dominated by
vertically integrated companies each of which functioned as producer,
distributor and exhibitor. 14 In United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 15 the Supreme Court ordered these companies to divest them-
selves of their exhibition operations.16 The Court found that vertical
integration in this industry violated the Sherman Act, in part because
small independent exhibitors were unable to compete for films in a
market dominated by exhibitors affiliated with national distributors.17
The Court thus recognized that competition in the area of film licens-
ing outweighed any efficiency-producing benefits of affiliation. 8
14. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir.
1982); id. at 498 app. (lower court opinion); M. Conant, Antitrust in the Motion
Picture Industry 84-112 (1960); M. Mayer, The Film Industries 109 (rev. ed. 1978);
Cassady, supra note 2, at 153-57. See generally The Paramount Decrees, supra note 4
(discussing Paramount and its progeny); Comment, Restraints on Motion Picture
Exhibition and the Anti-Trust Laws, 33 Nw. U.L. Rev. 424 (1938) (discussing the
structure of the motion picture industry).
15. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
16. Id. at 152.
17. Id. at 149-51, 154-55, 159-60, 162. When theater ownership was tied finan-
cially to film distributorship, the Court found that "the natural gravitation of films is
to the theatres in whose earnings the distributors have an interest." Id. at 151. Larger
affiliated or circuit exhibitors were given many advantages that were not available to
smaller, independent theater owners. In addition to being given the opportunity to
rent the film, they were allowed deductions in rental fees for showing double
features, maintaining extended exhibition periods and' providing special preview
exhibitions. Id. at 159-60; see Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672
F.2d 485, 498 app. (5th Cir. 1982) (lower court opinion).
18. Although the Court refused to require that motion pictures be licensed only
by a competitive bidding system, as the district court had recommended, United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53, 73-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), it was not because the Court
did not want a competitive atmosphere. In fact, the Court found a competitive
bidding system commendable. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 162. The Court did
not, however, want to grant a remedy that "involves the judiciary so deeply in the
daily operation of this nation-wide business." Id. Because the Court rejected the
district court's requirement of competitive bidding, the Court remanded the case to
enable the district court to fashion a new decree. Id. at 166. The district court, upon
further consideration, ordered additional divorcement of the exhibition, production
and distribution branches of the industry. 85 F. Supp. 881, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
For general discussions of Paramount and all its ramifications, see R. Cassady & R.
Cassady, The Private Antitrust Suit in American Business Competition 6-11, 32-37
(1964); M. Conant, supra note 14, at 84-106; M. Mayer, supra note 14, at 108-16;
Cassady, supra note 2, at 150-60, 177-80; Note, Judicial Regulation of the Motion
Picture Industry: The Paramount Case, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 662 (1947); The Para-
1983]
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After Paramount, competitive bidding and competitive negotia-
tions became the predominant methods of film licensing. 1 9 In compet-
itive bidding, distributors invite exhibitors to bid for specific films. 20
After examining the bids received, distributors license the film to the
exhibitors of their choice.2 1 If dissatisfied with the bids submitted a
mount Decrees, supra note 4; Note, Legislation By Consent in the Motion Picture
Industry, 50 Yale L.J. 854 (1941).
19. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488-89 (5th
Cir. 1982); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th
Cir. 1978); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285,
289 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123
(1964); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51
(W.D. Va. 1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415
(S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir. 1982).
In addition to competitive bidding and competitive negotiations, motion pictures
are licensed pursuant to state motion picture licensing acts. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 8-
18-1 to -6 (Supp. 1979) (first motion picture licensing act); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,
§§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). Twenty-three states have enacted motion
picture licensing acts. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 138
(E.D. Wis. 1983); Note, Motion Picture Licensing Acts: An Analysis of the Constitu-
tionality of Their Provisions, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 293, 295 & n.16 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Licensing Acts].
Films are also licensed through non-competitive bidding, a variety of competitive
bidding, in which the distributor will contact one theater in a given market and
license all its films to that theater, without contacting any other theater. Hence,
there is no competition among exhibitors. See General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista
Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1249-50 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Greenbrier Cinemas,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51 (W.D. Va. 1981).
20. E.g., Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488-89
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1050
(W.D. Va. 1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415
(S.D. Ohio 1980), af'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir. 1982); Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 640, 641 &
n.3 (W.D. Tex. 1975), modified, 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976); see Cassady, supra
note 2, at 160-64.
21. Selecting the most favorable bid is usually a very difficult process. The
distributor will consider, among other factors, rental fee (generally a percentage of
the gross box office receipts), guarantee or advance payment, theater size, theater
location, theater reputation and past grossing history, theater suitability for the
subject matter of the film, length of run (the number of weeks the exhibitor will show
the film), play dates (days of the week the picture will be shown), and clearance
(amount of time between runs). E.g., Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre
Co., 672 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1982); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre
Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 1978); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 289-90 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964). See generally M. Mayer, supra note 14, at 114
(discussing difficulty of selecting most favorable bid); Gordon, supra note 4, at 258
(same); The Paramount Decrees, supra note 4, at 1086 (same). Because of the
number of terms included in a bid, and their great variety, comparing and contrast-
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distributor may reject them and opt for an alternate method of licens-
ing, 22 such as competitive negotiations. In competitive negotiations,
distributors contact the individual exhibitor to whom they wish to
license their films. They then bargain with the exhibitor to arrive at
mutually agreeable terms.2 3
B. Split Agreements
The dissatisfaction of exhibitors with the competitive bidding proc-
ess, particularly the "large cash guarantees which the exhibitors were
required to put up to get pictures, '24 provided the impetus for the
development of split agreements. Split agreements ensure that each
split member has an initial right to bid or opportunity to negotiate for
certain films without competition from other split members.2 5 Because
other split members agree not to submit bids for films that have not
ing bids to determine the most lucrative offer is a task distributors seek to avoid. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 162-63 (1948); M. Mayer,
supra note 14, at 114; Cassady, supra note 2, at 164; Gordon, supra note 4, at 258.
22. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir.
1982); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th Cir.
1978); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 289
(3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964);
Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (W.D. Va.
1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aJ-'d in part and remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
23. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 138 (E.D. Wis. 1983);
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (C.D.
Cal. 1982); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1050
(W.D. Va. 1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415
(S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir. 1982). See generally Cassady, supra note 2, at 165-77 (describing competitive
negotiations).
24. Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 640, 641 (W.D.
Tex. 1975), modified, 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976); see Brown v. Western Mass.
Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302, 305 (1st Cir. 1961) ("competitive bidding was suicidal
for the exhibitors"); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 141-43
(E.D. Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp.
1244, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
25. Split agreements take two basic forms-the company split and the picture
split. In a company split, exhibitors who are members of the split assign a member
the right to negotiate for all of the upcoming film releases of a given distributor
without interference from fellow split members. Cassady, supra note 2, at 164;
accord Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir.
1982); Syufy Enters. v. National Gen. Theaters, Inc., 575 F.2d 233, 234 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp.
134, 139 (E.D. Wis. 1983). In the more common picture splits, the split members
agree that one member shall have the right to negotiate for a specific film before
fellow members may do so. Syufy Enters. v. National Gen. Theatres, Inc., 575 F.2d
233, 234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); United States v. Capitol Serv.,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Cassady, supra note 2, at 164.
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been designated to them, initially the split designee faces competition
only from exhibitors who are not members of the split.26 Although
split agreements may vary in other respects, they all require that
participants refrain from competing against the split designee while its
right to bid or opportunity to negotiate continues.2 7
The duration of this period of limited competition depends upon
the terms of the split agreement. Some split agreements prohibit the
submission of bids by other members until a specified period of time
has elapsed .2  Other agreements restrict competition only until the
distributor has rejected the split designee's bid.29 After the initial right
has lapsed, any member of the split is free to submit bids for the film,
unless the split agreement provides that the negotiation right is to be
reassigned to another split member.3 °
II. SPLIT AGREEMENTS AND THE SHERMAN ACT
Like other restraints of trade, split agreements are illegal under the
Sherman Act if they unreasonably destroy or suppress competition. 3'
In practice, if there are two exhibitors, one exhibitor will divide the films into two
lists. The other exhibitor then has the first choice of lists. For the next group of films,
the parties reverse roles. Gordon, supra note 4, at 240; The Paramount Decrees,
supra note 4, at 1108-09.
26. Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1139 (4th Cir.
1980); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 20 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1252-53 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see, e.g., Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
632 F.2d 1135, 1139 (4th Cir. 1980); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre
Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 1978); Syufy Enters. v. National Gen. Theatres,
Inc., 575 F.2d 233, 234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); Cinema-Tex
Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1976); Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 880 (1964); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d
285, 292 n.7 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S.
123 (1964); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 145-46 (E.D. Wis.
1983); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (W.D.
Va. 1981); United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 143 & n.6
(E.D. Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp.
1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
29. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 205
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney
Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1052, 1054-55 (W.D. Va. 1981); Cinema-Tex Enters. v.
Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Tex. 1975), modified, 535
F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. In some splits, the exhibitors agree that if the designee's bid is rejected by the
distributor, the split may reconvene and reallocate the right to negotiate for that film
to another split member. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134,
146 (E.D. Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F.
Supp. 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
31. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry.
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Distributors and the Department of Justice argue that split agree-
ments constitute horizontal market divisions32 and horizontal price
fixing agreements. 33 Independent exhibitors excluded from splits ar-
gue that the agreements constitute group boycotts.3 4 If split agree-
ments can be characterized as any of these activities, and lack suffi-
cient procompetitive virtues to overcome the presumption that such
activities are anticompetitive, per se treatment is appropriate.3 If the
potential procompetitive benefits of splits justify the time and expense
of evaluating them individually, however, the actual competitive ef-
fect of each split must be analyzed under the rule of reason to deter-
mine whether the split iinposes an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion. 36
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1911).
See supra note 5.
32. E.g., Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 154-55 (E.D. Wis.
1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255
(C.D. Cal. 1982). See Gordon, supra note 4, at 240-41 (splits are a form of market
division); United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1 (splits are
agreements to allocate market). See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
33. United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 2; e.g., Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890-92 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 149-54 (E.D. Wis. 1983); General
Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (C.D. Cal.
1982). See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
34. E.g., Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1140
(4th Cir. 1980); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890
(8th Cir. 1978); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1971). See
infra notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
35. Per se treatment is reserved for business practices which are "so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study ... is needed to establish their illegality."
National SoC'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); see
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) ("manifestly
anticompetitive"); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)
("naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition"); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue"); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d
1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980) ("plainly anticompetitive on their face and, equally
plainly, serve no legitimate procompetitive purpose"). See supra note 7 and accom-
panying text.
36. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); United States v. Realty Multi-List,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 167, 170 (3d Cir. 1979); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.
National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 127 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 918 (1974); Van Cise, supra note 7, at 1173. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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A. Classification Analysis
1. Group Boycotts
"[T]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per
se rule against group boycotts than ... any other aspect of the per se
doctrine. ' 37 Much of this confusion is due to what the Supreme Court
recently referred to as the "marked lack of uniformity in defining the
term [boycott] .'"3 Despite these problems, the Court has consistently
declared group boycotts to be among the types of business activity that
are per se violations of the Sherman Act.
39
The "classic boycott" 40 involves an agreement among competitors at
the same level designed either to impede entry into the market or to
drive existing competitors from it.4 ' In split agreements, by contrast,
competitors by acting together are able to gain better trade terms
from members of a different market level than they would if they
competed with each other.42 Whether this type of coercive conduct,
which is aimed at members of a different market level, is properly
37. L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 83, at 229-30; see United States v. Realty Multi-
List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v.
Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 370, at 495-96 (3d ed.
1981); R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 330 (1978); Concerted Refusals to Deal, supra
note 7, at 1532 & nn.5, 6.
38. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978); see
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se
Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 773, 799 (1974); Note, Boycott:
A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev.
818, 818-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Specific Definition].
39. E.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien,
390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146
(1966); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60
(1961) (per curiam); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1923); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914); see Con-
certed Refusals to Deal, supra note 7, at 1535.
40. L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 85; see Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa.
Bldg. Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 429-30 & n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 229 (1982); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
41. L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 85; see, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 4, 8-9 (1945); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600, 611 (1914); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166-69
(3d Cir. 1979).
42. See E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm.,
467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); L. Sullivan,
supra note 5, § 90.
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characterized as a group boycott is a subject of disagreement between
the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and lower courts and commen-
tators on the other.
43
In Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States44 and United
States v. First National Pictures, Inc. ,'4 for instance, film distributors
agreed upon the terms of standard form contracts to be offered to
exhibitors, and refused to deal with exhibitors who did not comply
with these terms.46 The Supreme Court held that these agreements
were conspiracies among the distributors designed to coerce exhibitors
into accepting the dictated contract terms and, therefore, were in
violation of section 1. 47 The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
this position, stating that:
[T]he boycotters and the ultimate target need not be in a competi-
tive relationship with each other. This Court also has held unlaw-
ful, concerted refusals to deal in cases where the target is a cus-
tomer of some or all of the conspirators who is being denied access
to desired goods or services because of a refusal to accede to partic-
ular terms set by some or all of the sellers. 48
Similarly, when split members refrain from submitting bids that com-
pete with the bid of the split designee, the distributor may in fact be
forced to accept the terms of the designee's offer. 49
Splits in which the first right of negotiation extends for a fixed
period of time may be coercive if there are few or no exhibitors in the
area that are not members of the split. s0 Under these circumstances
43. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
44. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
45. 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
46. Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 37, 41; First Nat'l Pictures, 282 U.S. at 50, 54.
47. Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 34; First Nat'l Pictures, 282 U.S. at 54-55.
Although the term "per se illegal" was not used in either of these early cases,
subsequent citations by the courts leave little doubt that a per se rule was applied.
See, e.g., United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 789
n.12 (7th Cir. 1981); id. at 794 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc.
v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977); GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1020 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977); cf. De Jong Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
618 F.2d 1329, 1335 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980) (addressing,
without resolving, question whether per se or rule of reason approach was taken in
Famous Lasky and First National Pictures).
48. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978).
49. See General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1259 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp.
640, 643 (W.D. Tex. 1975), modified on other grounds, 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D.
Tex. 1975), modified on other grounds, 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976). Exhibitors, in
general, prefer that all of the theater owners in their geographic area be members of
the split because the result is fewer exhibitors against whom they must compete. See
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distributors may not receive bids during the initial negotiation period
that offer reasonably attractive alternatives to the split designee's
bid. 51 If the initial negotiation period extends beyond the time within
which it is economically practical or feasible for the distributor to
wait for a more favorable offer, the distributor will be compelled to
accept the split designee's terms. 52 Even if the distributor can wait
until the designated period is over before licensing the films, other
exhibitors may already have filled their schedules.5 3 This is particu-
larly true when there is a surplus of films on the market.5 4 As a
practical matter, therefore, the distributor will be forced to acquiesce
in the split designee's terms.
Split agreements that require members to refrain from submitting
competing offers only until the distributor has rejected the split desig-
nee's bid would not be characterized as boycotts under the Supreme
Court's definition. Bids can be submitted by other members of the
split if the distributor, finding the split designee's offer unsatisfactory,
merely rejects the designee's bid.55 The distributor then can choose the
bid with the terms most favorable to it.55 Characterization of split
agreements as coercive boycotts is possible under the Court's defini-
tion depending upon the existence of competing exhibitors and the
duration of the exclusive negotiation opportunity or bidding right.
A contrary position has been taken by commentators57 and lower
courts, 5  who disagree with the classification of coercive refusals to
deal as per se illegal group boycotts. They argue persuasively that per
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255, 1257
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
51. Cf. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-
93 (1978) (analogous reasoning applied to competitive bidding among engineers).
52. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1255, 1259, 1261 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
53. Id. at 1255, 1259, 1261; see Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511
F. Supp. 1046, 1058 (W.D. Va. 1981).
54. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
55. Id. at 1258; see Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d
1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1980).
56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. P. Areeda, supra note 37, 370, at 495-96; L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 90;
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847,
876-79 (1955); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripefor
Reexamination, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 685, 705 (1979); McCormick, Group Boycotts-
Per Se or Not Per Se, That is the Question, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. 703, 707-08 (1976);
Woolley, supra note 38, at 775; Specific Definition, supra note 38, at 824-27;
Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1131, 1150-
52 (1980).
58. Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147, 1160-
61 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1983) (No. 83-
[Vol. 52
MOTION PICTURE SPLIT AGREEMENTS
se illegality should be reserved for "classic boycotts" used to suppress
competition by impeding the entry of potential competitors into the
market or by depriving them of essential trade relationships."9 They
suggest that coercive boycotts aimed at another market level60 are
more like price fixing agreements than classic boycotts in that the
primary purpose of the arrangement is not to exclude the victim from
competition, but rather to further the business interests of the conspir-
ing parties."'
Under this characterization of group boycotts, splits may only be
properly considered per se illegal in actions brought by exhibitors-
the horizontal competitors that are excluded from competition.62
There are, however, significant obstacles to such actions. A plaintiff-
exhibitor bringing a suit against a defendant-exhibitor will generally
have no cause of action, for it suffers no injury. 63 Exclusion from the
splitting group will help, rather than harm, the exhibitor because
instead of competing with potentially all of the exhibitors who are
split members, it will have to compete only with the split designee.
Accordingly, the exhibitor-victim must establish distributor partici-
pation, consent or acquiesence in the split in order to allege a cause of
271); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670
F.2d 421, 429-30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229 (1982); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978); DeFilippo v. Ford Motor
Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975); see Drayer
v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir.) (quoting L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 90, at
256), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978); see also Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia
Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 492 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (questioning viability of per se
rule against group boycotts).
59. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
61. See P. Areeda, supra note 37, 370, at 495-96; L. Sullivan, supra note 5,
§ 90, at 257; see also Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d
1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1983) (purpose of coercive arrangement was to "extract the
highest possible prices," rather than to "freeze out their competitors"), cert. granted,
52 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1983) (No. 83-271).
62. For instances where exhibitors have asserted that they have been excluded
from competition by horizontal competitors, see Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia
Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1982); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas
Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d
17 (9th Cir. 1971); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320
F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123
(1964); Brown v. Western Mass. Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1961); Royster
Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 268
F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Seago v. North Carolina
Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 388 F.2d 987 (4th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968).
63. Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir.
1980); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 20 (9th Cir. 1971); see P. Areeda,
supra note 37, 314, at 341 n.18. See supra note 62.
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action.64 Under this characterization, only if the exhibitor-victim can
prove the requisite vertical element to the split arrangement will the
split constitute a per se unreasonable group boycott.
2. Horizontal Market Divisions
Both distributors 5 and the justice Department 6 argue that split
agreements are horizontal market divisions because split members
allocate among themselves the right to negotiate with distributors or
bid for films. Horizontal market divisions are presumed to be illegal
because their effect is to restrict competition among otherwise com-
petitive parties.6
Exhibitors object to this classification of split agreements, 68 arguing
that the horizontal market divisions the Supreme Court has judged
64. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 492 (5th Cir.
1982); Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir.
1980); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir.
1978); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1971); General
Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1274-75 (C.D. Cal.
1982). Why distributors would participate or acquiesce in the split agreement is a
question which has never been satisfactorily answered. For the most plausible expla-
nations, see Gordon, supra note 4, at 241 & n.5, 259.
There are numerous obstacles to proving the requisite vertical arrangement be-
tween the exhibitor and distributor, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a detailed treatment of these problems, see Southway Theatres, Inc. v.
Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 499-502 app. (5th Cir. 1982) (lower court
opinion).
65. See, e.g., Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892
(8th Cir. 1978); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp.
1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1982); accord Gordon, supra note 4, at 240-41.
66. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 149 (E.D. Wis.
1983); United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1.
67. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951); see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899).
See generally L. Sullivan, supra note 5, §§ 79-82 (examining per se illegality of
horizontal market divisions); Gordon, supra note 4, at 240, 246 (comparing splits
with other forms of horizontal market division); Comment, Horizontal Territoral
Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457 (1971) (discussing per se
illegality of horizontal territorial market divisions) [hereinafter cited as Horizontal
Territorial Restraints].
68. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892 (8th Cir.
1978). Horizontal market divisions are unlawful whether entered into by competing
buyers or competing sellers. See United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d
1270, 1272 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); cf. Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (buyer re-
straint of trade); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600, 614 (1914) (retailer association restraint of trade).
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illegal were territorial,69 and that splits are product or customer allo-
cations.70 The distinction between territorial and customer or product
allocations, however, does not require different treatment under the
antitrust laws. 71 The product or customer allocations agreed upon by
split members harm competition in the same manner as territorial
restrictions, in that ultimately the number of offers received or alter-
natives available to the distributor is reduced. Rather than ensuring
that another exhibitor will not conduct business in a particular geo-
graphic area, however, splits limit competition for a particular film or
distributor's business. 72 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc. ,'73 recognized that customer allocations have an anti-
competitive effect comparable to that of territorial restrictions. 74
Courts have rejected the characterization of split agreements as
horizontal market divisions, however, because splits do not com-
pletely eliminate competition for films. 75 This reasoning is mistaken
because horizontal market divisions are per se illegal even if they do
69. The major Supreme Court precedents discussing market divisions are: United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388
U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see Horizontal Territorial Restraints, supra note 67, at
465-67.
70. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892 (8th Cir.
1978).
71. In Continental T.V., Inc.. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fact that one restriction was addressed to territory
and the other to customers is irrelevant to functional antitrust analysis." Id. at 46.
The Fifth Circuit has termed the difference between a territorial allocation and a
customer allocation "a distinction without substance." United States v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1088 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903
(1978). Similarly, the Second Circuit has found no "significant difference between an
allocation of customers and an allocation of territory." United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1961); see United States v. Capitol
Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 154 (E.D. Wis. 1983). Professor Sullivan has com-
mented that to distinguish between territorial, customer or product allocations is "to
draw overly fine distinctions." L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 79, at 213.
72. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892 (8th Cir.
1978).
73. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
74. Id. at 612.
75. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892 (8th Cir.
1978); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255
(C.D. Cal. 1982); see Bork, supra note 7, at 826; Gordon, supra note 4, at 240; cf.
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (refusing to apply per se rule in part because the
"alleged restraint does not completely eliminate competition for players' services.").
But see United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 154-55 (E.D. Wis.
1983).
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not entirely eliminate competition. 76 As the Supreme Court stated in
Topco, "[o]ne of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market struc-
ture to allocate territories in order to minimize competition. '77 Split
members, by agreeing not to compete with one another, in effect
agree to minimize competition.
7
Furthermore, the initial rights guaranteed by splits may be tanta-
mount to exclusive rights of negotiation. Distributors may need to get
their films licensed for economic reasons, including credit and promo-
tional purposes, before an initial negotiation period has expired. 7 In
addition, if the negotiation rights are reallocated pursuant to the split
agreement, other split members will continue to refrain from compe-
tition. Competition in these instances is at least substantially reduced,
if not entirely eliminated.80
Moreover, horizontal market divisions should be subject to height-
ened scrutiny because they are potentially more harmful to competi-
76. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 154-55 (E.D. Wis.
1983), is the first decision correctly finding split agreements to be per se illegal
horizontal market divisions, despite the fact that competition for films was not
entirely eliminated. Prior to Capitol Service, the horizontal market division argu-
ment had been consistently rejected. See Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre
Co., 585 F.2d 877, 892 (8th Cir. 1978); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib.
Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Gordon, supra note 4, at 240-41;
The Paramount Decrees, supra note 4, at 1072.
Whether business activity runs afoul of the Sherman Act is not dependent upon its
successfully restraining trade. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12, 17 &
n.16 (1945); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940); Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930); United States v.
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978). An arrangement may be illegal if it has "either an unlawful purpose or an
anticompetitive effect." McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (em-
phasis in original); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436
n.13 (1978); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940); see also United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969)
("The continuation of some price competition is not fatal to the Government's
case."); L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 82, at 226, 229 (per se treatment appropriate for
"arrangement which, in purpose or effect, would divide markets."). See infra note
110 and accompanying text.
77. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (emphasis
added).
78. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 155 (E.D. Wis. 1983);
Gordon, supra note 4, at 240.
79. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1255, 1259, 1261 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
80. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
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tion than other forms of per se unreasonable activity.$' While price
fixing agreements restrain only price competition, market divisions
may affect all forms of rivalry. 82 For example, if a market is divided
by customer allocation, sellers do not have to compete for the victim-
customer's business. Thus, no incentive exists for sellers to become
more efficient or improve product quality or service. Similarly, alloca-
tion of distributors or films among split members reduces the incentive
for exhibitors to offer a more attractive outlet for the distributor's
films. As the Supreme Court has noted, "all elements of a bargain-
quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among
alternative offers."8 3 Even if split agreements do not entirely eliminate
competition among exhibitors for film licenses, they are particularly
pernicious because, by allocating customers, they reduce the need for
exhibitors to compete in all other areas of their businesses. Split agree-
ments, therefore, possess the anticompetitive characteristics of a hori-
zontal market division.
3. Horizontal Price Fixing Agreements
Horizontal price fixing agreements are arrangements "for the pur-
pose and with the effect of ... depressing ... price."84 Distributors
argue that split agreements, by reducing the number of bids submit-
ted, reduce competition for film licenses. Less competition or demand
for a product invariably reduces the price that buyers are willing to
pay for it. Split members thus keep the price of film licenses down by
limiting the number of offers that distributors receive. 5 Exhibitors
81. L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 82 (1977); cf. Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 33 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) (customer allocation inherently as bad
as price fixing), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941).
82. L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 82, at 224-25.
83. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978); see L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 82, at 224-25.
84. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). More
recently, Professor Sullivan has defined horizontal price fixing in similar terms: "any
arrangement among competitors which, in purpose or effect, directly or indirectly
inhibits price competition." L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 74, at 198.
Horizontal price fixing agreements generally have been held per se illegal viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 344-348 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980)
(per curiam); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897).
85. See Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890 (8th
Cir. 1978); Royster Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
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have, in fact, admitted that one purpose of split agreements is to lower
the price of film licenses. 81
Exhibitors claim, nevertheless, that splits are not price fixing ar-
rangements because split members agree only to refrain from initial
competition with the split designee for a limited period of time, and
not to set prices. 87 Price fixing agreements, however, need not directly
set prices to be considered illegal as long as they are designed to, or do,
affect price.88
In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,89 the Supreme Court held
that an agreement by wholesalers to refuse free credit to retailers
constituted price fixing, even when there was no agreement among
the wholesalers regarding the actual price. 0 The Court recognized
that credit, as a direct component of cost, affected prices directly9
and also noted that it had held other agreements "that had substan-
tially less direct impact on price" unlawful per se.92 For example,
Theatres, Inc., 268 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959);
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 150, 146-47 (E.D. Wis. 1983);
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1262 (C.D.
Cal. 1982). The Justice Department shares the view that splits are per se illegal price
fixing agreements. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 149 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); United States Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 2.
86. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 141-43 (E.D. Wis.
1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1254
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
87. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1256-57 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585
F.2d 877, 890-92 (8th Cir. 1978); cf. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595
F.2d 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1979) (manufacturer charged with price fixing claimed
that refusal to deal with discount retailer was not price fixing because arrangement
did not set prices at exact level).
88. It is the agreement that violates the Sherman Act. Whether the conspiracy is
or will be successful is irrelevant to § 1 analysis. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 & n.59 (1940); see United States v. Container Corp. of Am.,
393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978) (dictum). See supra note 76 and accom-
panying text.
89. 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 645-46, 650.
91. The Court characterized credit as "an inseparable part of the price." Id. at
648; see Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969).
92. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647. As examples of this proposition, the Court cited
Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), and National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647.
Neither of the arrangements in these cases, however, appears to have had a "substan-
tially less direct impact on price," id., than the arrangement in Catalano. In Sugar
Institute, fifteen sugar refiners announced, through a trade association, prices, terms
and conditions of sale. They agreed, inter alia, that upon announcement they would
not change these terms. The Court found this practice to be an unreasonable restraint
of trade, despite the refiner's argument that there was no agreement setting their
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agreements that tend to stabilize price, such as agreements to ex-
change price information, may be price fixing arrangements. 3
In addition, the Supreme Court has also held that mere "interfer-
ence with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per
se."9' 4 Splits interfere with the market forces that would otherwise
determine price by reducing the number of competitive bids re-
ceived. 95
Furthermore, in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,96 the Court held that a professional society's ethical
canon prohibiting competitive bidding, while "not price fixing as
such, '9 7 was illegal because it "impedes the ordinary give and take of
individual prices. Sugar Institute, 297 U.S. at 601. An agreement not to change
prices, however, appears to be a direct, not indirect, attempt to prevent the free
fluctuation of price. Indeed, the district court had found that the dominant purpose
of the trade association was "to create and maintain a uniform price structure,
thereby eliminating and suppressing price competition among themselves." Id. at
577. See United States v. Sugar Inst., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 817, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1934),
a]f'd and modified on other grounds, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). National Society is
unsatisfactory support because of the continuing dispute as to whether the Court in
that case found the challenged practice illegal under the per se rule or the rule of
reason. See infra notes 99-101.
More persuasive support might have been found in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), which held that inherent in an agreement among
dealers not to sell cars through "discount houses," id. at 129-30, was a restraint on
price competition which was per se illegal "even when the effect upon prices [was]
indirect." Id. at 147. Similarly, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940), oil companies merely established a floor or minimum level which in-
creased the stability and firmness of prices. Id. at 223. Although the practice did not
fix prices directly, id. at 222, it was held illegal because any "market manipulation in
its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to ... market
prices, a force which distorts those prices, a factor which prevents the determination
of those prices by free competition alone." Id. at 223.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1936); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-85 (1925); United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921). See generally Note, Antitrust Liability
For An Exchange of Price Information-What Happened to Container Corpora-
tion?, 63 Va. L. Rev. 639 (1977) (discussion of exchanges of price information and
per se doctrine).
94. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); see
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
95. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890-91 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 150, 146 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1262 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
97. Id. at 692.
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the market place."98 Lower courts have questioned whether this case
justifies applying a per se analysis to split agreements because the
Court found the prohibition "illegal on its face," 9 but did not ex-
pressly relate its holding to the per se rule against price fixing.100 The
Court has subsequently relied on this ruling, however, to support its
application of the per se rule to other agreements affecting price.' 10
The Eighth Circuit has distinguished the prohibition on competitive
bidding in National Society from the limitations on competition im-
posed by splits. 0 2 Noting that National Society involved an ethical
canon of a professional society, the Court of Appeals refused to evalu-
ate business activities by the same standard'0 3 because the Supreme
Court has stated that "[t]he fact that a restraint operates upon a
profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act.1' 0 4 The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that business
98. Id. (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F.
Supp. 457, 460 (1975), modified, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679
(1978)). Competing engineers were prohibited from discussing price with potential
customers until after negotiations were completed and the customer made an initial
selection of an engineer. Id. The dominant purpose behind the Society's canon,
which the Court termed a "ban on competitive bidding," id., was a fear that
selection on the basis of price would tempt engineers to cut costs by doing "inferior
work" which would endanger the public. Id. at 693.
99. Id. at 692-93.
100. As a result of the Court's failure to expressly state that the ethical canon was
per se unlawful, lower courts have differed as to which rule was applied. Compare
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) ("ethical rule was held illegal per se without elaborate analysis of procom-
petitive benefits") with Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d
877, 891 (8th Cir. 1978) ("ethical standard . . . illegal on the basis that it was
unreasonable under the rule of reason"). See generally P. Areeda, supra note 37,
347, at 444 (questioning whether per se rule or rule of reason was applied).
101. Recent pronouncements by the Court indicate that National Society is to be
treated as a case applying the per se rule. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam) (citing National Society as a per se case). In
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the three dissenting
justices stated that in National Society the Court "held unlawful as a per se violation
an engineering association's canon of ethics that prohibited competitive bidding by
its members." Id. at 362 (Powell, J., dissenting). See United States v. Capitol Serv.,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 150 n.15 (E.D. Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena
Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
102. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 891 (8th Cir.
1978).
103. Id.
104. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). In Goldfarb,
the plaintiffs sought to purchase a house through a financing agency which required
title insurance. Procuring such insurance required a title examination which could
only be performed by a member of the Virginia State Bar. Id. at 775. All of the
attorneys approached by the plaintiff charged the amount suggested by a bar associa-
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activities should be evaluated under a stricter standard than the acti-
vities of professional organizations. 0 5 If a professional organization's
restrictions on competitive bidding are facially illegal, split agree-
ments, which are restrictions in a business setting, should be evaluated
at least as harshly. The fact that the prohibition in National Society
involved a professional society, therefore, does not materially alter the
antitrust analysis.106
Exhibitors argue that splits do not have an effect on price because
competition with exhibitors who are not members of the split may
continue despite the existence of the split agreement. 0 7 Accordingly,
the split designee's bid must remain competitive with those of non-
split exhibitors. Furthermore, because the distributor retains the
power to reject the split designee's bid, the split only reduces license
fees if the distributor agrees to accept the lower fee.10 An agreement
with the purpose or effect of influencing prices, however, is itself
illegal. 109 Unsuccessful combinations in restraint of trade are as illegal
tion minimum-fee schedule. Id. at 776. The Court found the minimum-fee schedule
to be a violation of the Sherman Act, but noted that the analysis traditionally applied
to a business is different from that applied to the professions. Id. at 788 n.17; see
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-87 (1978); United
States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952). But see Mardirosian
v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 637 (D.D.C. 1979) (professions
receive no special antitrust treatment). See generally Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar: The Professions are Subject to the Sherman Act, 41 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1976)
(discussing relationship between antitrust laws and learned professions); Note, The
Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Goldfarb: Reformulating the
Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 Duke L.J. 1047 (identify-
ing a new, limited learned profession exemption); Note, Application of the Antitrust
Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 991 (1977)
(examining relationship between antitrust laws and learned professions).
105. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686
(1978).
106. See Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 891 (8th
Cir. 1978).
107. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1257
(C.D. Cal. 1982); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046,
1054-55 (W.D. Va. 1981); see Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585
F.2d 877, 887 (8th Cir. 1978); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 20 (9th
Cir. 1971). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
108. See General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1258 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp.
1046, 1052-55 (W.D. Va. 1981), Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 414
F. Supp. 640, 642-43 (W.D. Tex. 1975), modified on other grounds, 535 F.2d 932
(5th Cir. 1975); Cassady, supra note 2, at 164-65.
109. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) ("limita-
tion or reduction of price competition brings the case within the [per se] ban");
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966) ("protection of
price competition from conspiratorial restraint is an object of special solicitude under
the antitrust laws"). See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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as successful ones.110 As the Court stated in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.,"' "[a]ny combination which tampers with price
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity."'" 2 Split agreements thus
have the essential characteristics of per se illegal price fixing arrange-
ments even though they do not directly set prices.
B. The Per Se Rule and Procompetitive Justifications
Split agreements have the anticompetitive characteristics of hori-
zontal market divisions, horizontal price fixing agreements and, de-
pending upon the nature of the agreement, group boycotts. Thus,
they literally fit within classifications that are per se illegal.
1. Blanket Music Licenses and Split Agreements
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,"3 the Supreme Court held that a
blanket music license that literally fixed prices" 4 had to be analyzed
under the rule of reason despite the fact that it had the characteristics
of a per se illegal restraint of trade." 5 The Court found that the
110. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940);
United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1085 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he
Sherman Act reaches unsuccessful restraints on interstate commerce as well as those
which have not been shown to affect the price of goods or services in the market
place."), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978). See supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
ill. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
112. Id. at 221.
113. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
114. Id. at 8-9.
115. Id. In BMI, CBS challenged the issuance of blanket licenses to perform
copyrighted musical compositions by the two major licensing organizations, Broad-
cast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP"). A blanket license permits the licensee to broadcast all of the
compositions in the licensing organization's repertory for a set price and period of
time. ASCAP represents approximately 22,000 members and 3 million compositions;
BMI represents about 30,000 members and 1 million works. Almost every musical
composition copyrighted in the United States is in either ASCAP or BMI's catalogue.
Id. at 5; see Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal argued, No. 83-7058
(2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1983); S. Shemel & M. Krasilovsky, This Business of Music 135-38
(rev. ed. 1971). The fee for the blanket license is generally based on either a percent-
age of the licensee's total revenues or a flat dollar amount. It is not based on the
amount, type or popularity of the music performed.
CBS, the "giant of the world in the use of music rights," CBS v. American Soc'y of
Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1
(1979), argued that the blanket license is a per se illegal price fixing agreement
because ASCAP and BMI set prices. The district court found that the blanket license
was not per se illegal because BMI and ASCAP only set prices for the entire repertory.
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presumption of illegality did not apply to this price fixing agreement
because the blanket license increased competition among existing
products by creating a "different product"" 6 with "unique character-
istics.' 1 7 The Court also recognized that blanket licenses did not
appear to have an anticompetitive purpose," 8 were widely used in the
industry"" and were not the only means of obtaining rights to musical
compositions.120 In addition, the Court stated that Congress had rec-
ognized the economic benefits of blanket licenses when, "[n]otwith-
standing any provisions of the antitrust laws,' 2' it provided for their
use under certain circumstances in the Copyright Revision Act of
1976.122
Individual composers were free to set their own prices. 400 F. Supp. at 748. The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the "blanket license dulls [the copyright own-
er's] incentive to compete" and therefore, is a form of per se illegal price fixing. 562
F.2d at 139. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Second Circuit. 441
U.S. at 25. On remand, the blanket license was held to be lawful. CBS v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 970 (1981). See generally Wood, The "Market Necessity" Defense in Anti-
trust: A New Limit on the Area For Application of Per Se Rules?, 54 Ind. L.J. 29
(1978) (examining analyses of district court and court of appeals).
116. 441 U.S. at 22.
117. Id. The blanket license competes with individual composers, and therefore
promotes, rather than suppresses, competition. The blanket license offers the same
product as the individual composer-the performing rights to a song-but also offers
the rights to other compositions in the organization's catalog, and the cost advantages
and transaction savings that come from dealing with a clearinghouse. Thus, the
blanket license is actually a product different from, and in competition with, that
offered by the individual composer. Id. at 22-23; cf. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940) (distinguishing Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), on the ground that the challenged activity in
Chicago created a new public market). But see Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. Ameri-
can Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 293-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (finding that the anticompetitive effects of blanket licenses on price competi-
tion outweigh any cost savings to local television stations, as opposed to television
networks), appeal argued, No. 83-7058 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1983).
118. 441 U.S. at 23-24.
119. Id. at 20-21, 24. The Court described the blanket license as an "obvious
necessity" in the industry. Id. at 20. In addition, it found it "reasonably necessary" to
the continued existence of the trade intended by the Copyright Act. Id. at 19. See
infra notes 121, 125 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 12, 24. Compositions may also be licensed, for example, on a "per-
program" basis, in which case the fee is based on the revenues of the particular
program on which the organization's music is used. Id. at 11. Also available is "direct
dealing" between the network, or user, and the individual composer. Id. at 12; see
Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
546 F. Supp. 274, 288-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal argued, No. 83-7058 (2d Cir. Nov.
1, 1983).
121. 441 U.S. at 15 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1981)).
122. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
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Noting similarities between blanket licenses and split agreements,
courts have questioned whether split agreements should be analyzed
under the rule of reason enunciated in BMI.L2 3 Split agreements, like
blanket licenses, arguably provide "a more flexible, practicable and
efficient method of licensing" than competitive bidding124 and are
widely used in the film industry. 125 They remain substantially differ-
ent, however, from the blanket license in BMI and therefore should
not be analyzed under the same rule.
In BMI, the Court found that alternative licensing arrangements
were available to the networks as "no practical impediments pre-
vent[ed]" them from dealing directly with composers.2 6 Split agree-
ments, however, prevent the distributor from dealing with members
123. Compare United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 151 (E.D.
Wis. 1983) (finding "fundamental differences" between blanket licenses and splits);
and General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1260-61
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (BMI "has little relevance to the legal analysis of splits."); with
Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1052-53 (W.D. Va.
1981) (BMI "closely on point").
124. Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (W.D.
Va. 1981); see United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wis.
1983).
125. In BMI, the Court noted:
With this background in mind, which plainly enough indicates that over
the years, and in the face of available alternatives, the blanket license has
provided an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of the market for
the performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions, we cannot agree
that it should automatically be declared illegal in all of its many manifesta-
tions. Rather, when attacked, it should be subjected to a more discriminat-
ing examination under the rule of reason.
441 U.S. at 24. Similarly, split agreements have enjoyed widespread acceptance in
the motion picture industry. Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F.
Supp. 1046, 1051 (W.D. Va. 1981); Gordon, supra note 4, at 241; United States
Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1.
Both splits and blanket licenses have been subjected to extensive judicial scrutiny.
Compare Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1979) (discussing consent
decrees and litigation involving blanket licenses) with Viking Theatre Corp. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964) and The Paramount
Decrees, supra note 4, at 1042-43 (discussing consent decrees and litigation involving
motion picture licensing) and Cassady, supra note 2, at 159 n.65.
126. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Available to the
networks, besides the blanket license, were "per-program" licenses, based on a
percentage of the actual revenues for the particular program on which the organiza-
tions' music is played, id. at 11, and "direct dealing" between the television network
and the individual composer, id. at 12. But see Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. Ameri-
can Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 285-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (per-program, direct dealing and source licensing not realistically available
alternatives to local television stations), appeal argued, No. 83-7058 (2d Cir. Nov. 1,
1983).
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of the split other than the split designee. 127 The split thus limits the
distributor's alternatives. Furthermore, alternatives exist only in in-
stances where there are non-split exhibitors interested in a distributor's
films or after the initial negotiation period has lapsed. 128 Even in the
latter instance, split exhibitors often redesignate the negotiation rights
to a different split member 12 9 and, therefore, deprive the distributor of
alternative choices.
In addition, split agreements, unlike blanket licenses, do not pro-
mote competition by creating a new product that competes with the
product that exhibitors already offer. Nor do they create a new mar-
ket level that is an alternative to dealing with exhibitors directly.
130
Moreover, in BMI the Court found that neither the music licensing
organizations nor the composers appeared to have anticompetitive
motives. 3 1 Exhibitors, however, have admitted anticompetitive mo-
tives when splits have been challenged in court. 132 Finally, unlike
blanket licenses, Congress has not recognized split agreements as ex-
ceptions to the antitrust laws under any circumstances. 133 As the
127. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir.
1978); Cinema-Tex Enters. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.
1976); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1261
(C.D. Cal. 1982); cf. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 695 (1978) (ethical canon preventing competitive bidding limits customers'
ability to choose from alternatives).
128. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1258
(C.D. Cal. 1982); see, e.g., Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d
1135, 1140 (4th Cir. 1980) (distributors free to refuse to license film); Greenbrier
Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1052, 1054-55 (W.D. Va. 1981)
(distributor free to reject bid and solicit competitive offers); Gordon, supra note 4, at
260 (distributors are always free to award licenses to the exhibitor of their choice).
129. If negotiations between the distributor and the split designee are not fruitful,
the split may reconvene and reallocate the rights of negotiation, General Cinema
Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1982), or two
participants may simply trade rights, id. at 1258; Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v.
Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (W.D. Va. 1981). This practice makes splits
more anticompetitive because it prevents the first rights of negotiation from lapsing
and, accordingly, prevents open competition. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc.,
568 F. Supp. 134, 145-46 (E.D. Wis. 1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista
Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
130. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 151 (E.D. Wis. 1983);
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
131. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20, 23-24 (1979).
132. See Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 890 (8th
Cir. 1978) (exhibitors did not dispute that purpose of split was to depress film rental
prices); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 141-42 (E.D. Wis.
1983) (testimony tending to confirm anticompetitive purpose of splits); General
Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1254-55 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (same).
133. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court noted in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. ,134 "a
decision . . . to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy
for greater competition in another portion [must] be made by Con-
gress. ' ' 3. Split agreements, therefore, lack the characteristics of the
BMI blanket license that justified an analysis of its purpose and effect
under the rule of reason. Accordingly, the holding in that case does
not require a rule of reason analysis for determining the legality of
split agreements.
2. Procompetitive Justifications
In BMI, the Court analyzed the economic justifications for blanket
licenses even though the licenses literally fit within a category of per se
illegal activity. 136 This suggests that "legal characterization of a class
of restraints requires 'a judgment about [its] competitive signifi-
cance' " in light of "relevant 'economic conceptions.' "137 The eco-
nomic justifications for split agreements must be analyzed, therefore,
to determine whether they offer any procompetitive benefits that are
"'sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them."'1 38 Unless the procompetitive conse-
quences of splits overcome the presumption that they are anticompeti-
tive, splits fall within the rationale of the per se rule, and thus, are per
se illegal. 139
134. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
135. Id. at 611; see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
354-55 (1982).
136. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 19-24 (1979). Similarly, in Na-
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the Court
entertained the Society's procompetitive defense that competitive bidding would
tempt engineers to do inferior work in order to lower prices, ultimately endangering
public safety. Id. at 693. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. Again, in
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam), the chal-
lenged practice was found to be per se illegal because no procompetitive justification
was offered and it had "no apparent potentially redeeming value." Id. at 646 n.8,
649.
137. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir. 1980)
(quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692,
690 n.16 (1978)); see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 362-
63 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 646 n.8, 649 (1980) (per curiam) (discussing procompetitive justifications).
138. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
139. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 457
U.S. 332 (1982); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1364 (5th
Cir. 1980); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 167, 170 (3d Cir.
1979); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119,
127 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Board of Regents v.
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By designating which exhibitors can bid for certain films, split
agreements may ensure that the same films are not shown at too many
theaters within a given geographic area, 140 thus reducing the likeli-
hood that theaters will draw upon the same audiences. Although
exhibitors have a business interest in maximizing audiences and reve-
nues, the split arrangement is not necessary to achieve this purpose.
The distributor also has an economic interest in maximizing exhibitor
box office receipts as it generally receives a percentage of those re-
ceipts as part of the licensing fee.' 4 ' The distributor thus tries to avoid
licensing the same film to theaters in close proximity with one an-
other. 42 The restraint on trade, therefore, is not necessary to achieve
the business purpose asserted and remains unreasonable. 43
Exhibitors argue that the split agreement also ensures that small
exhibitors will have an opportunity to bid on certain films without
"ruinous competition" from more powerful exhibitors. 144 They assert,
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3309
(U.S. Oct. 17, 1983) (No. 83-271). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
140. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 504 app.
(5th Cir. 1982) (lower court opinion); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre
Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 134, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
141. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir.
1982); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 289
(3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964);
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 137 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415, 418 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd
in part and remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); M. Conant,
supra note 14, at 70-71; M. Mayer, supra note 14, at 61; Gordon, supra note 4, at
258; Licensing Acts, supra note 19, at 306. For a detailed discussion of the practices,
techniques and concerns involved in negotiating rental fees, see M. Conant, supra
note 14, at 58-83; M. Mayer, supra note 14, at 60-65; Cassady, supra note 2, at 165-
177. Distributors generally would prefer not to use percentage arrangements with
smaller theaters because on a low-gross business, percentage deals will not leave the
exhibitor with sufficient profits to cover its operating expenses, and the small amount
of revenue does not justify the transaction costs involved in percentage deals. Id. at
167 n.110.
142. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 882 (8th Cir.
1978); M. Conant, supra note 14, at 58-59; see Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia
Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1982).
143. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 18-22 (1979) (blanket license
necessary to achieve business purpose and, therefore, reasonableness must be ana-
lyzed under rule of reason); R. Bork, supra note 37, at 279 (horizontal agreement per
se unlawful if not capable of increasing effectiveness of business purpose and if
broader than necessary to achieve that purpose).
144. See Royster Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 268 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959);
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wis. 1983);
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moreover, that this result is consistent with the policy enunciated by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., ' 45 in
which large distributors were required to divest themselves of their
holdings to protect smaller, unaffiliated exhibitors.146 The Court in
that case was concerned, however, with the potential for collusion
engendered by affiliation between distributors and exhibitors, not
with the protection of exhibitors who could not withstand the rigors of
competition. 147
Furthermore, avoidance of "ruinous competition" is not a valid
defense to an antitrust charge.148 Even though less "cut throat" com-
petition may make it possible for small, independent exhibitors to
compete, 49 the Sherman Act is not designed to protect competitors
from the effects of competition. 50 Rather, it reflects a legislative
General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1274 (C.D.
Cal. 1982); Bork, supra note 7, at 826 & n.162; Cassady, supra note 2, at 165 n.96;
Gordon, supra note 4, at 260.
145. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
146. Id. at 149-53.
147. The Court recognized that:
The trade victims of this conspiracy have in large measure been the small
independent operators. They are the ones that have felt most keenly the
discriminatory practices and predatory activities in which defendants have
freely indulged. They have been the victims of the massed purchasing power
of the larger units in the industry..It is largely out of the ruins of the small
operators that the large empires of exhibitors have been built.
Id. at 162; see M. Conant, supra note 14, at 84; M. Mayer, supra note 14, at 108-12.
The cause of the hardships in Paramount, however, was not fierce competition
between independent exhibitors, but competition between small, independent exhib-
itors and exhibitors which were affiliated with large, powerful distributors. 334 U.S.
at 154, 159-60. Despite these evils the Court refused to require competitive bidding,
even though it would be a "great boon" to independent exhibitors, because it would
involve the judiciary too deeply in the daily operations of a nation-wide business. Id.
at 162; see Brown v. Western Mass. Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302, 304 (1st Cir. 1961);
M. Conant, supra note 14, at 101. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
148. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345, 349
(1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 n. 16
(1978); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1972); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-22 (1940); Gordon, supra note 4, at
260.
149. See General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1274 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The fact that well-intentioned split members may be inter-
ested in helping competing exhibitors remain in the market will not save the arrange-
ment from illegality. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930);
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912); see also United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966) (motivation not rele-
vant); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941)
(anticompetitive intent not necessary for violation of Sherman Act).
150. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Chief Justice
Warren made the now classic pronouncement that "[t]aken as a whole, the legislative
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judgment that open competition provides the best means of ensuring
the efficient allocation of resources. 15' This allocation is not achieved
by protecting less efficient competitors. 152 Moreover, small indepen-
dent exhibitors are often excluded from split agreements, as is evi-
denced by the fact that many of these exhibitors are plaintiffs in suits
challenging split agreements on antitrust grounds.15 3
history [of the Sherman Act] illuminates congressional concern with the protection of
competition, not competitors." Id. at 320 (emphasis in original). But cf. United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-55 (1944) (Sherman
Act enacted in response to fear that large trusts had power "to crush small indepen-
dent traders").
151. The Supreme Court made this abundantly clear in Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition.
Id. at 4; National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) ("competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services"); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Sherman
Act is the "Magna Carta" of free enterprise); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,
248 (1951) ("The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition"); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1945)
(purpose of Sherman Act is to protect free enterprise system); Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930) ("preservation of competition is
the primary consideration"); see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899) (citing
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895)).
152. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S 643 (1980) (per curiam), it
was argued that a horizontal agreement to eliminate credit sales facilitated market
entry and remainder in the market by offering greater potential returns on invest-
ment. The Court rejected this argument, however, because all price fixing arrange-
ments could be said to offer this benefit and thus be immune from antitrust chal-
lenge. Id. at 649.
153. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1273
(C.D. Cal. 1982); see, e.g., Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672
F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1982); Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632
F.2d 1135, 1139 (4th Cir. 1980); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co.,
585 F.2d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 1978); Syufy Enters. v. National Gen. Theatres, Inc.,
575 F.2d 233, 234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); Cinema-Tex Enters.
v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1976); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy
Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 18 (9th Cir. 1971); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964); Brown v. Western Mass. Theatres, Inc., 288
F.2d 302, 303 (1st Cir. 1961); Royster Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 268 F.2d 246, 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
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Split members assert that competition for audiences is heightened
by the split agreement because each member of the split is assured the
right to bid for an attractive product.15 4 It is argued that if all split
members exhibit quality films, the films themselves will not be the
factor that attracts a viewer to a particular theater. Competition in
other factors, such as ticket price, concession quality and theater
maintenance, will be encouraged. 155 This effect on competition for
audiences, however, depends upon each split member being allocated
a quality film. It also assumes that competition in these other areas
will be stimulated if theaters exhibit films of comparable quality.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated, competition "cannot be
foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy."'156
This is properly a matter for legislative determination. 157
Exhibitors also argue that splits provide greater "lead time"'' 58 in
which to advertise and promote films, thus increasing competition
among exhibitors for audiences.1 59 They claim that the time between
licensing and releasing a film is longer under the split system than
under the complex and time consuming system of competitive bid-
ding.'60 Actual licensing practices do not support this contention.
Distributors initiate competitive bidding five or six months in advance
of the film release date.16 ' Split meetings to allocate films are usually
U.S. 885 (1959); Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 629
(E.D.N.C. 1966), affd per curiam, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 959 (1968); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,347, at
76,374 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F.
Supp. 1046, 1048 n.4 (W.D. Va. 1981) (motion to intervene by exhibitor claiming it
was injured by split).
154. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1273
(C.D. Cal. 1982) ("splits are needed to assure that all exhibitors get their 'fair share'
of quality films"); see United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153
(E.D. Wis. 1983).
155. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153-54 (E.D. Wis.
1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1268
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
156. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
157. Id. at 611.
158. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1270-71 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Lead time is the period between the date of the licensing
agreement and the exhibition date.
159. Id.
160. Id. As a result of its complexity, "[c]ompetitive bidding takes place in rela-
tively few situations." Cassady, supra note 2, at 161. Competitive bidding for one
film may involve 2400 transactions. Id. at 161 n.77. See supra note 21 and accompa-
nying text.
161. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1271
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
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held only one to two months in advance of the release date. 16 2 Distrib-
utors, accordingly, do not receive bids from members until several
months after they have actively sought to license the film. The split
system, therefore, shortens the time between bidding and exhibition if
the distributor is interested in licensing a film to a split member. 1
63
Furthermore, if a split designee faces less competition for a film, it has
less incentive to complete negotiations at an early date.
Exhibitors also argue that split bidding is less elaborate and time
consuming than open competitive bidding and, therefore, reduces
transaction costs. 6 4 Reduction of transaction costs is a desirable eco-
nomic goal 65 but it does not override the interest in preserving free
competition embodied in the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act does not
permit the restraint of competition in order to avoid inconvenience
and expense. 16
Split agreements restrict competition for film licenses and do not
foster any procompetitive economic efficiencies that are "sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense" 167 that evalua-
tion under the rule of reason entails. There is no reason, therefore, to
remove them from the categories of traditionally anticompetitive con-
duct that the Supreme Court has condemned as per se violations of the
Sherman Act.
3. Judicial Experience
Per se characterization of a particular practice has often been with-
held until the judiciary has become familiar with the particular indus-
162. Id.
163. See id. (no factual evidence that splits increased lead time).
164. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153-54 (E.D. Wis.
1983); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1272
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
165. Reduction of transaction costs promotes competition by reducing prices and
permitting a more efficient allocation of resources. For example, in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that one procompetitive
justification of blanket licenses was their ability to accomplish in one or two transac-
tions what would otherwise take 4,000 to 8,000, and to reduce the need to police or
monitor users to ensure that they are not using unlicensed compositions. Id. at 20-23
& nn.35-36. Similarly, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978), the Court noted that exchanges of price information are not per se illegal
forms of business activity because they may increase economic efficiency and, there-
fore, competition. Id. at 441 n.16; see United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629
F.2d 1351, 1364-65 (5th Cir. 1980); L. Sullivan, supra note 5, § 74, at 200.
166. General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1272
(C.D. Cal. 1982); see United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153-54
(E.D. Wis. 1983).
167. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
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try and practice at issue. 68 Consequently, some courts have been
reluctant to apply the per se doctrine to split agreements because they
have not had considerable experience in analyzing them and have not
consistently found them to be anticompetitive. 69 In Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society,170 however, the Supreme Court re-
jected "the argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every
industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation.' 171
This suggests that it is the classification of a category of restraints as
per se illegal that requires experience, not the application of the per se
label to a previously established category of per se restraint in a new
industry. Indeed, despite a lack of antitrust experience in the health
care industry, the Court, in Maricopa, applied the per se rule to a
restraint that it categorized as price fixing. 72 Similarly, because split
agreements fall within the well established categories of horizontal
price fixing, horizontal market division and group boycott-restraints
with which the judiciary has had considerable experience-courts
should not be reluctant to evaluate them under the per se rule.
Furthermore, courts have had extensive experience with the motion
picture industry. 73 Few industries have been subjected to as much
168. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); id. at
364 (Powell, J., dissenting); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); Northrop Corp. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1051-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 156 (1983); Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 890-91 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549,
555 (7th Cir. 1980); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83,
88 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Van Cise, supra note 7, at
1172-73.
169. See, e.g., Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046,
1051 (W.D. Va. 1981).
170. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
171. Id. at 351.
172. Id. at 357. Competing physicians formed medical societies which established
maximum fees for specific services provided to patient-policyholders of certain medi-
cal insurance plans. The State challenged the arrangements, claiming they were per
se illegal forms of price fixing which-violated the Sherman Act and the equivalent
Arizona statute. Id. at 335-36 & n.1. The Supreme Court held, in a closely divided 4-
3 opinion (with Justices Blackmun and O'Connor not participating), that the maxi-
mum price fixing scheme was per se unlawful. Id. at 357; see 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 363
(1983) (discussing price fixing agreements and Maricopa); 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 253
(1983) (examining significant differences in analysis taken by majority and minority
in Maricopa).
173. See M. Conant, supra note 14, at 84-106 (describing the numerous court
decisions concerning the motion picture industry between 1928 and 1951). Between
1951 and 1957 alone, at least 351 private antitrust actions were brought in the
industry. Id. at 178-79. See supra note 125.
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regulatory and judicial activity aimed at creating fair trade. 174 Simi-
larly, courts have had the opportunity to analyze split agreements.
Although some courts have refused to apply the per se rule to split
agreements, 175 most courts that have assessed the competitive impact
of these agreements have found that they are anticompetitive in na-
ture.176 Moreover, the position of the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division 77 has, since 1977, been that it considers all splits to be per se
violations of the Sherman Act. 178 Judicial reluctance to classify split
agreements as per se illegal is thus unfounded.
CONCLUSION
For decades motion picture split agreements have survived antitrust
scrutiny and, specifically, evaded the per se rule. Split agreements,
however, are properly characterized as horizontal market divisions,
horizontal price fixing arrangements and, in some instances, group
boycotts. As such, their pernicious effect on competition may be
presumed and an elaborate rule of reason examination of their com-
petitive significance is not necessary unless countervailing procompeti-
tive justifications are offered. Given that the asserted benefits to the
economy do not, in fact, withstand analysis, the appropriate judicial
reaction is clear: Split agreements are per se illegal restraints of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.
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